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STATE V. SIKORA
Psychiatric Testimony And The Doctrine
Of Diminished Responsibility
State v. Sikora1
Defendant Sikora was the product of an unhappy and unfortunate
childhood, having lived in various foster homes and institutions until
he reached the age of nineteen years. On January 15, 1962, some two
weeks after he had been rejected by the woman with whom he had been
living, defendant was involved in a barroom fight 'with one Hooey and
was beaten and thrown out of the tavern by Hooey and two or three of
his friends. Defendant later returned to the tavern armed with an
automatic pistol with which he shot and killed Hooey. Sikora was
apprehended, tried before a jury, convicted of first degree murder, and
sentenced to life imprisonment. At the trial defendant interposed no
defense of insanity2 but sought to introduce evidence that "circum-
stances to which Sikora had been subjected imposed on his personality
a stress that impaired or removed 'his ability consciously to premeditate
or weigh a design to kill." 8 Defendant sought to confine the crime to
second degree murder on the ground that he was incapable of pre-
meditation and deliberation' because his decisions and conduct were
1. 44 N.J. 453, 210 A.2d 193 (1965).
2. New Jersey applies the basic M'Naghten test of criminal insanity, which
states that the defendant is not legally responsible for his act if at the time of com-
mitting the act he was laboring under such a defect of reason from disease of the mind
as to not know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know it,
that he did not know what he was doing was wrong. See State v. Lucas, 30 N.J. 37,
152 A.2d 50 (1959).
3. 210 A.2d at 201.
4. "Murder which is perpetrated by means of poison, or by lying in wait, or by
any other kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing, or which is committed
in perpetrating or attempting to perpetrate arson, burglary, kidnapping, rape, robbery
or sodomy, is murder in the first degree. Any other kind of murder is murder in the
second degree." 2A:113--2 N.J.S.A. (1953). See PSRKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 72 (1957),
for a general pattern used by many states in the definition of first degree murder.
"All murder which shall be perpetrated by means of poison, or lying in wait, or any
other kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing, or which shall be com-
mitted in the perpetration, or attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery or
burglary, shall be murder in the first degree.... .See, e.g., MicH. STAT. ANN.
§ 28.548 (1954).
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mechanically directed by unconscious influences which necessarily re-
sulted from tensions to which he was subjected at the time.
The trial court refused to 'admit psychiatric evidence on that issue,
and on appeal the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed by 4-3 decision,
reasoning that criminal responsibility must be judged at the level of
the conscious, and where a defendant plans and executes a crime con-
sciously, criminal responsibility cannot be denied, wholly or partially.
The court did not specifically reject the theory of partial or diminished
responsibility based on mental illness or deficiency, which it had previ-
ously accepted, 5 but felt here that the proffered evidence was "unreliable
or too speculative or incompetent when tested by concepts established
in law for the determination of criminal responsibility '8 and hence
inadmissible. The court indicated that such evidence was admissible
only on the issue of punishment. However, exclusion in this case
was held not to be prejudicial error, since defendant had been sen-
tenced to the lesser punishment of life imprisonment without recourse
to such evidence.
The rule which holds that voluntary intoxication may negate the
specific intent required as an element of the crime is accepted in a
majority of states either by judicial opinion7 or by statute.' Where a
specific intent is an essential ingredient of the crime charged, it must
be alleged and proven by the prosecution.' If voluntary intoxication
is to be accepted as a valid factor negating specific intent, it follows
that evidence of any condition, including mental or emotional state,
should be admissible for the purpose of establishing incapacity to enter-
tain the requisite intent. To date, at least twelve states have allowed
evidence of mental condition, not amounting to legal insanity, to be
considered in determining. whether premeditation and deliberation re-
quired for first degree murder in fact existed.'0 The Supreme Court
5. See State v. DiPaolo, 34 N.J. 279, 168 A.2d 401, 409 (1961), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 880 (1961), in which the court stated the rule: "Hence evidence of any defect,
deficiency, trait, condition, or illness which rationally bears upon the question whether
those mental operations did in fact occur must be accepted."
6. State v. Sikora, 44 N.J. 453, 210 A.2d 193, 202 (1965). These concepts
referred to by the court probably are the basic M'Naghten insanity tests set out in
note 2 supra.
7. See, e.g., Ray v. State, 257 Ala. 418, 59 So. 2d 582 (1952) ; People v. Burk-
hart, 211 Cal. 726, 297 Pac. 11 (1931) ; Teer v. Commonwealth, 307 Ky. 602, 212
S.W.2d 106 (1948) ; State v. Tansimore, 3 N.J. 516, 71 A.2d 169 (1950); State v.
Reposa, 206 A.2d 213 (R.I. 1965). Cf. Commonwealth v. Simmons, 361 Pa. 391, 65
A.2d 353 (1949), which held that where the murder occurs in the commission of a
crime which does not require specific intent (e.g., robbery) intent is immaterial and
the defendant cannot invoke the doctrine of diminished responsibility. State v. Jordan,
285 Mo. 62, 225 S.W. 905 (1920) ; Clinton v. State, 132 Tex. Crim. App. 303, 104
S.W.2d 39 (1937) ; State v. Tatro, 50 Vt. 483 (1878).
8. See, e.g., ARIZ. CODE § 43-112 (1939) ; CAL. PENAL CODE § 22 (1949) ; IDAHO
CODE § 18-116 (1948).
9. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 674 (1957).
10. See People v. Henderson, 60 Cal. 2d 482, 386 P.2d 677 (1963) ; People v.
Wells, 33 Cal. 2d 330, 202 P.2d 53 (1949) ; Battalino v. People, 118 Colo. 587,
199 P.2d 897 (1948) ; Ingles v. People, 92 Colo. 518, 22 P.2d 1109 (1933) ; State v.
Saxon, 87 Conn. 5, 86 Atl. 590 (1913) ; Andersen v. State, 43 Conn. 514 (1876);
State v. Johnson, 40 Conn. 136 (1873) ; Everett v. State, 208 Ind. 145, 196 N.E. 77
(1935) ; Hopkins v. State, 180 Ind. 293, 102 N.E. 851 (1913); Donahue v. State,
165 Ind. 148, 74 N.E. 996 (1905) ; Aszman v. State, 123 Ind. 347, 24 N.E. 123 (1890) ;
Robinson v. State, 113 Ind. 510, 16 N.E. 184 (1888) ; State v. Padilla, 66 N. Mex.
289, 347 P.2d 312 (1959), noted in 20 MD. L. REv. 376 (1960) ; State v. DiPaolo,
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of the United States long ago stated the intoxication rule broadly
enough to include mental disorder." Similarly, courts in several juris-
dictions have expressed a diminished responsibility rule broadly enough
so that they might later hold emotion or mental disorder to be included
in the rule, although not actually applying it to such a case.' 2 Several
states have expressly rejected the rule as applied to mental condition.' 3
Maryland follows the general view that the state has the burden
of showing premeditation in a trial for first degree murder.' 4 The
Court of Appeals has consistently followed the majority rule allow-
ing evidence of intoxication to go to the jury on the issue of pre-
meditation.'" This rule was first clearly announced in Chisley v. State.'"
In that case, the Court of Appeals seemed to base the rule on Hopt
v. Utah,17 citing Hopt's broad language which was not limited to the
34 N.J. 279, 168 A.2d 401 (1961) ; State v. Fenik, 45 R.I. 309, 121 At. 218 (1923) ;
Drye v. State, 181 Tenn. 637, 184 S.W.2d 10 (1944) ; State v. Green, 78 Utah 580,
6 P.2d 177 (1931) ; State v. Anselmo, 46 Utah 137, 148 Pac. 1071 (1915) ; Dejarnette
v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. 867 (1881) ; Oborn v. State, 143 Wis. 249, 126 N.W. 737(1910) ; Hempton v. State, 111 Wis. 127, 86 N.W. 596 (1901). Compare Foster v.
State, 222 Ind. 133, 52 N.E.2d 358 (1944). The rule has been accepted in dicta in
New York. See People v. Moran, 249 N.Y. 179, 163 N.E. 553 (1928), commented
on, Weihofen, Partial Insanity and Criminal Intent, 24 ILL. L. Rzv. 505 (1930). And
it has perhaps been accepted in Kentucky, Montana, and Oregon. See Rogers v.
Commonwealth, 96 Ky. 24, 27 S.W. 813 (1894) ; Mangum v. State, 19 Ky. L. Rep. 94(1897) ; Horn v. Commonwealth, 292 Ky. 587, 167 S.W.2d 58 (1943) ; State v.
Leakey, 44 Mont. 354, 120 Pac. 234 (1911) ; State v. Leland, 190 Ore. 598, 227 P.2d
785 (1951). But see Perciful v. Commonwealth, 212 Ky. 673, 279 S.W. 1062 (1925).
11. "But when a statute establishing different degrees of murder requires de-
liberate premeditation in order to constitute murder in the first degree, the question
whether the accused is in such a condition of mind, by reason of drunkenness or
otherwise, as to be capable of deliberate premeditation, necessarily becomes a material
subject of consideration by the jury." Hopt v. Utah, 104 U.S. 631, 634 (1881). But
see Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463 (1946), in which the Court refused to extend
the Hopt doctrine, affirming the District of Columbia trial court's refusal to allow
the jury to consider evidence of defendant's psychopathic aggressive tendencies, low
emotional response, and borderline mental deficiency on the issue of premeditation and
deliberation. The Court felt that a Utah statute specifically establishing a partial
insanity rule in intoxication cases influenced the Hopt decision and that the "or
otherwise" dictum in Hopt could only refer to various stages of intoxication.
Id. at 475.
12. E.g., McAffee v. United States, 111 F.2d 199, 204 (1940) ; People v. Brislane,
295 Ill. 241, 129 N.E. 185 (1920) ; People v. Walker, 38 Mich. 156 (1878) ; Jones v.
Commonwealth, 75 Pa. 403 (1874). But see note 13 infra.
13. See Foster v. State, 37 Ariz. 281, 294 Pac. 268 (1930) ; State v. Van Vlack,
57 Idaho 316, 65 P.2d 736 (1937); State v. Holloway, 156 Mo. 222, 56 S.W. 734
(1900) ; State v. Paulsgrove, 203 Mo. 193, 101 S.W. 27 (1907). The rule has perhaps
been rejected in four other jurisdictions. See Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463(1946) (District of Columbia) ; Commonwealth v. Cooper, 219 Mass. 1, 106 N.E. 545
(1914) ; State v. Skaug, 63 Nev. 59, 161 P.2d 708 (1945) ; State v. Fisko, 58 Nev. 65,
70 P.2d 1113 (1937) ; Jacobs v. Commonwealth, 121 Pa. 586, 15 Atl. 465 (1888);
Commonwealth v. Wireback, 190 Pa. 138, 42 Atl. 542 (1899); Commonwealth v.
Szachewicz, 303 Pa. 410, 154 Atl. 483 (1931). But see Commonwealth v. Stabinsky,
313 Pa. 231, 169 Atl. 439 (1933), in which the court allowed evidence of partial
responsibility in mitigation of penalty.
14. "All murder which shall be perpetrated by means of poison, or lying in wait,
or by any kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing shall be murder in the
first degree." MD. CODE ANN. art. 27, § 407 (1957).
15. See Martin v. State, 228 Md. 311, 179 A.2d 865 (1961) ; Lipscomb v. State,
223 Md. 599, 165 A.2d 918 (1960) ; Breeding v. State, 220 Md. 193, 151 A.2d 743(1959) ; Stansbury v. State, 218 Md. 255, 146 A.2d 17 (1958) ; Soldiveri v. State,
217 Md. 412, 143 A.2d 70 (1958) ; Chisley v. State, 202 Md. 87, 95 A.2d 577 (1952).
16. 202 Md. 87, 95 A.2d 577 (1952).
17. See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
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effect of intoxication on the issue of deliberation and premeditation."8
So on the basis of Maryland's voluntary intoxication decisions, a
defense of diminished responsibility based on mental illness or deficiency
seems at least logically arguable. In Spencer v. State, 9 the landmark
decision establishing the M'Naghten right and wrong test of legal
insanity in Maryland, 20 the Court of Appeals was also confronted with
an argument that the defendant's mental state precluded a finding of
first degree murder. The trial court had excluded proffered evidence
of mental condition, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.
The court said that the principle of Hopt may be conceded but refused
to apply it to the facts before it.21 Since the defendant admitted that
he had consciously planned and executed the murder, while arguing
that his thoughts and actions were involuntary because of his obsession
with the wrongs he thought the deceased had done to his (defendant's)
wife, this decision does not specifically preclude recognition of the
doctrine of diminished responsibility in the usual case. In Armstead
v. State,22 the argument of diminished responsibility was offered in
the case of an epileptic defendant accused of first degree murder. The
Court of Appeals upheld a conviction for that offense. Although the
decision is justifiable in that the evidence of diminished responsibility,
which had been heard by the judge sitting without a jury, was not
strong, the opinion tended to confuse two separate and distinct con-
cepts: legal insanity, which is sufficient to exculpate a defendant of
any crime, and mental disorder which prevented the defendant from
forming the specific criminal intent required for first degree murder.28
The Maryland court after accepting the basic doctrine with limita-
tions in Spencer v. State appears to have considered the diminished
responsibility argument as an attempt to modify the firmly established
criminal insanity rules, when in reality it is a distinct formal argu-
ment based on specific intent or lack thereof. Thus the Maryland court
may have rejected the doctrine without fairly considering it.24 The
1967 statutory amendment, modifying the M'Naghten insanity test in
Maryland, would seemingly 'permit a wider range of psychiatric testi-
mony to be admitted on the issue of insanity; however, this statute
18. See Chisley v. State, 202 Md. at 107, 95 A.2d at 586 (1952).
19. 69 Md. 28, 13 Atl. 809 (1888).20. "And according to the law, as we find it settled by the great preponderance
of judicial authority, if the party accused be competent to form and execute a criminaldesign; or in other words, if at the time of the commission of the alleged offense, hehad capacity and reason sufficient to enable him to distinguish between right and
wrong, and understand the nature and consequences of his act, as applied to himselfhe is a responsible agent, and amenable to the criminal law of the land for the con-
sequences of his act." Id. at 37 13 Atl. at 812.
21. Id. at 41-42, 13 At. at'815.
22. 227 Md. 73, 175 A.2d 24 (1961).
23. "It is manifest that if she is to obtain relief, under the facts of this case,
upon either theory, the rule laid down in Spencer must be broadened or modified.Armstead v. State, 227 Md. 73, 76, 175 A.2d 24, 26 (1961).
24. In Allen v. State, 230 Md. 533, 188 A.2d 159 (1963), the Court of Appeals
states that in Armstead v. State, "this court refused to adopt the so-called diminished
responsibility rule." As the trial judge in both cases had heard the evidence, the
court seems to mean by the phrase "refused to adopt" that there was not sufficient
evidence to justify overturning the finding of fact below. In neither case did the
court say that the evidence should not have been considered.
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does not necessarily affect the permissible scope of psychiatric testimony
on the issue of diminished responsibility. 25 Therefore, it remains to be
seen whether the statute will have a liberalizing effect in the latter area.
The Sikora decision is similar to the Spencer and Armstead de-
cisions in Maryland. Although accepting the basic diminished respon-
sibility doctrine, Sikora emasculates it by framing it in terms of the
test established for determining criminal insanity. 26 The defense is
one of lack of specific intent, not insanity per se, and to require evi-
dence of legal insanity is only to confuse two distinct issues. The
question is more properly one of fact for jury determination, and no
relevant evidence should be excluded. This case creates many prob-
lems of interpretation at least for New Jersey trial courts, because it
requires them to decide whether evidence of mental condition is admis-
sible on the issue of premeditation and deliberation by weighing its
reliability, speculative nature, and conformity with existing insanity
tests. The burden of deciding which psychiatric evidence, much of
which is likely to be highly technical, is to be admitted in the case is
thus placed upon the trial judge. It would seem more reasonable to
allow all logically relevant evidence to be heard by the triers of fact
and eliminate judicial screening of psychiatric evidence bearing on the
issue of specific intent. No defendant should be convicted of a specific
intent crime without a jury finding of such intent.
Two primary reasons have been advanced in support of the accept-
ance of the doctrine of diminished responsibility.27 First, it is funda-
mental in our legal system that criminal punishment should be propor-
tioned not only to the seriousness of the crime but also to the individual
culpability of the criminal. To punish an individual for a crime of
which he had not the required mental state would be inconsonant with
this system. Second, the rigidity of our present law may induce a
jury to acquit a mentally deficient defendant where they cannot convict
him of a lesser offense. Thus, the -net effect may -be the release of
mental defectives into society rather than institutionalization of them.
On the negative side, objections to the rule generally concern
problems of application.28 The diminished responsibility concept pre-
sents a jury with the seemingly impossible task of determining whether
a legally sane defendant was so mentally disturbed as to be incapable
of premeditating. In such cases there may 'be a tendency for juries
to reach compromise second degree murder verdicts. For example,
a jury faced with the task of determining a defendant's sanity in a
25. See 1967 amendment to MD. CODE ANN. art. 59, §§ 7-12 (1957), establishing
a statutory test for criminal insanity based on the proposals of the American Law
Institute. This amendment provides that a defendant is not responsible for criminal
conduct "if, at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect, he
lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of law."
26. ". . . Evidence of 'any defect, deficiency, trait, condition, or illness which
rationally bears upon the question' whether the accused did in fact premeditate is
admissible in a first degree murder trial. But . . . if such evidence was unreliable or
too speculative or incompetent when tested by concepts established in law for the
determination of criminal responsibility, it should not be received on the issue of guilt
or innocence or the degree thereof." 210 A.2d at 202.
27. See Weihofen, Partial Insanity and Criminal Intent, 24 ILL. L. Rpv. 505 (1930).
28. See WsIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE 185-89 (1954).
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prosecution for first degree murder might settle for a verdict of second
degree murder by reason of mental diminished responsibility where
they are unable to decide the insanity question. The effect of such a
verdict is a decision neither sought by nor acceptable to the prosecution
or defendant. But this practical difficulty is not much different from
that presented by the issue of insanity and must be faced in order to ap-
ply existing principles in a logical and just manner. Another possible
objection is that the rule may be logically extended to all specific intent
crimes 29 and even to crimes requiring only general criminal intent. °
This would have the ultimate effect of establishing an entirely new
test for criminal insanity based upon mens rea alone.-' Extension of
diminished responsibility to any specific intent crime is logically pos-
sible, but the reductio ad absurdum argument for application to general
intent crimes would surely be rejected as an attempted circumvention
of existing criminal insanity rules. Finally, it may be argued that a
diminished responsibility rule would permit mental defectives to be
turned loose on society sooner than sane and possibly less dangerous
criminals by virtue of their shorter prison terms. More specifically,
it is contended that the rule would have the effect of greatly restricting
convictions for first degree murder since the majority of murders are
in reality committed by either mentally deficient or defective persons,
or by defendants under such circumstances as intoxication or heat of
passion, which could likewise render the defendant incapable of pre-
meditation and deliberation. This is a serious objection because the
individual, who, by reason of his mental condition, acts on impulse or
without volitional control, is more prevalent than the rational cold-
blooded or professional criminal. One possible method of minimizing
this last problem might be a mandatory psychiatric examination of any
defendant convicted of second degree murder by reason of diminished
responsibility with possible commitment and treatment under Mary-
land's Defective Delinquent Statute32 or its equivalent.
29. The rule of voluntary intoxication negating specific intent has been applied
in various other situations. People v. Neetens, 42 Cal. App. 596, 184 Pac. 27 (1919)
(obtaining by false pretenses) ; State v. Pasnau, 118 Iowa 501, 92 N.W. 682 (1902)(assault) ; Hall v. Commonwealth, 310 Ky. 718, 221 S.W.2d 652 (1949) (breaking and
entering with intent to steal) ; People v. Guillett, 342 Mich. 1, 69 N.W.2d 140 (1955)
(attempt to rape) ; Bullock v. State, 195 Miss. 340, 15 So. 2d 285 (1943) (attempt
to commit burglary) ; Edwards v. State, 178 Miss. 696, 174 So. 57 (1937) (larceny)
Amey v. State, 53 Okla. Crim. 205, 9 P.2d 49 (1932) (forgery).
30. But see Commonwealth v. Simmons, 361 Pa. 391, 65 A.2d 353 (1949), cert.
denied, 338 U.S. 862 (1949), holding that voluntary intoxication is no defense to murder
committed in the perpetration of robbery or burglary (first degree murder), since no
specific intent to take life is required to commit that crime.
31. "The new test would be: was the defendant, at the time of the act charged,
suffering from mental disorder preventing him from entertaining the mens rea, or
criminal intent, requisite to constitute the crime ?" WtIHOFEN, MFNTAL DISORDER AS A
CRIMINAL DEFENSE 188 (1954).
32. MD. COD ANN. art. 31B (1957). Section 5 of this article defines a defective
delinquent as "an individual who, by the demonstration of persistent aggravated anti-
social or criminal behaviour, evidences a propensity toward criminal activity, and who
is found to have either such intellectual deficiency or emotional unbalance, or both,
as to clearly demonstrate an actual danger to society so as to require such confinement
and treatment, when appropriate as may make it reasonably safe for society to
terminate the confinement and treatment." Section 6 provides that "a request may
be made that a person be examined for possible defective delinquency if he has been
convicted and sentenced in a court of this State for a crime or offense coming under
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Generally, these objections to the diminished responsibility rule
are directed not so much to the logical soundness of the rule but to the
practical difficulties in and consequences of its administration. The
American Law Institute in its Model Penal Code advocates the admis-
sion of evidence of mental disease or defect when relevant to a criminal
defendant's state of mind where that state of mind is an element of the
offense. 8  This view is also espoused by leading authorities in the field
of criminal insanity. 4 The basic premises of the rule are logically
sound and consonant with our fundamental concepts of criminal justice.
Although problems of application may arise, such difficulties should
not preclude assertion of the defense and the evidence necessary to
establish it.
one or more of the following categories: (1) a felony; (2) a misdemeanor punishable
by imprisonment in the penitentiary; (3) a crime of violence; (4) a sex crime in-
volving: (A) physical force or violence, (B) disparity of age between an adult and
a minor, or (C) a sexual act of an uncontrolled and/or repetitive nature; (5) two or
more convictions for any offenses or crimes punishable by imprisonment, in a criminal
court of this State."
33. "Evidence that the defendant suffered from a mental disease or defect is
admissible whenever it is relevant to prove that the defendant did or did not have a
state of mind which is an element of the offense." MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.02(1),
comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
34. See, e.g., Weihofen and Overholser, Mental Disorder Affecting the Degree of
A Crime, 56 YALE L.J. 959 (1947) ; Keedy, Problem of First Degree Murder: Fisher
v. United States, 99 U. PA. L. Rxv. 267 (1950).
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